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We aim to explore with Dumont’s work how cinema can manifest a fundamental 
question of freedom. What brings Friedrich Schelling into proximity with Dumont is 
that Schelling Treatise was considered to inaugurate a new understanding of Being, as 
a “metaphysics of evil.” It is “evil” in its actuality that is the central concern for 
Schelling. It is evil in the mundanity of an everyday that haunts the cinema of 
Dumont. Dumont, as is well known, was himself an academic philosopher, who has 
indicated in interviews that his teaching extended to the Classics, Plato and Aristotle, 
the Stoics, and German Idealism, particularly Kant and Hegel. I note this reply by 
Dumont to a question concerning his philosophy teaching and his reason for moving 
on: “That’s very easy to answer. Philosophy is an intellectual discipline. Its tools are 
concepts, whereas film is about movement, it’s about capturing “being” onscreen. I 
find that when I’m shooting a stream in a field, for example, then I’m filming a being. 
It is far easier to understand, less complicated, less intellectual.” Dumont completed 
his fifth film at the end of 2009, with his sixth film currently in post-production. He 
has been spectacularly ‘successful’ with this relatively small body of work, receiving 
two Cannes Grand Jury Prizes for Flanders and L’Humanité, as well as many other 
awards at festivals internationally. Prior to his ‘auteur’ cinema, Dumont learnt his 
‘trade’ making industry films: “I filmed candies, tractors, ham, bricks, coal … It is how 
I learnt cinema.”5  
 
I will say something briefly about each of the three films I want to mention by way of 
introduction to our concern. They are L’Humanité (1999), Twenty Nine Palms (2003) and 
Flanders (2006). Each of the films is discussed in Martine Beugnet’s Cinema and Sensation 
(2007), within her broader discussion of films she compellingly describes as “sensate 
cinema.” Thus she suggests:  “There is something particularly engaging in finding this 
kind of cinematic practice, with its emphasis on the corporeality of film … It goes 
against the tradition of scenario and/or dialogue based cinema that dominates French 
production.” Beugnet engages in a sustained discussion on a range of filmmakers over 
the past fifteen years whose work veers towards ‘sensation’ rather than ‘sense’, to 
‘corporeality’ rather than ‘idea’. She quotes Dumont on this: “I am interested in 
sensation, not sense.”  She further quotes Matthieu Darras from an interview with 
Dumont on Flanders: “There is this sentence that Bruno Dumont keeps repeating in 
his interviews, as if he were brandishing a banner: ‘Cinema is for bodies, cinema is for 
emotions’. … Dumont’s cinema is a cinema that shocks—a visceral cinema.” At times 
she emphasizes the qualification of the cinematic with Dumont’s camera technique. 
On this she cites Kent Jones discussing L’Humanité: “Dumont does the typical 
shot/counter-shot move, but he stays on the object seen for an uncomfortable 
interval, and it never yields anything: unlike 99% of the movies you see, there’s no 
mental or poetic correlative between the looker and the looked at. There’s a terrific 
power to these moments, a basic, brutally elemental longing for the world to explain 
itself.”  
 
With each film, in the transgressive and sensual dimensions of its unfolding, there is 
the haunt of evil. L’Humanité’s unconscionable evil is the rape and murder of an 
eleven-year-old girl. It has already happened at the opening of the film. The film’s 
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“detective,” traumatized by this event, ineptly pursues the case. The film shows the 
encounter of his ‘world’, what opens or shows itself in the way that he is: his without 
words, how seeing and the seen find themselves with him, his being-with-others as a 
tactile longing, his seeming without-will. His ‘world’ is a provincial rural township; his 
locale brings near a neighbour and her lover. The film concerns how these three each 
comes to a self in the milieu of an infinite separation of being a self. That milieu opens 
a question as to how the actuality of being, the act of being, in its becoming itself is a 
question of a freedom for good and for evil. The act of sex as a creature’s living 
creative act constitutes the essential terrain of this milieu: the detective’s capability to 
be incapable, his neighbour’s unspeaking and mechanical couplings with her lover, 
her without-will, releasement to what is; the lover’s will for himself alone, his not-
being-with as a being-with. 
 
Twenty Nine Palms, though located in California and not rural France, though having a 
couple, man and woman, lovers on a location-scouting trip in the desert, constitutes 
the same essential terrain. Dumont refers to it as a ‘classic’ horror movie bloodbath, 
triggered by the rape-bashing of the man while his lover is forced to look on. This film 
plays a similar economy of silences, beings coming to themselves, the act of sex as the 
actuality of being-with, which also may mean missing being-with. Again, there is a 
strong concern with how seeing and the seen find themselves in a belonging, or 
cannot find that belonging. Flanders returns Dumont to a rural locale in northern 
France. We recognize across the three films how ‘nature’ is not savage and cruel. The 
farmlands and the desert are domesticated, worked over, occupied and adjusted. They 
don’t walk the desert terrain. They drive an air-conditioned Hummer. The fields are 
ploughed using a towering tractor. We occupy the insides of these adjusting and 
accommodating spaces as we occupy a film. With Flanders, there is again the act of sex 
as actuality for created creatures. The young men from the locale are conscripted to 
fight in what looks like Afghanistan. In this interlude, this desert setting of combat 
there occurs the rape of a woman soldier by the small squad of men from this 
northern French locale. The mood of the film, as with the other two, concerns more 
the silent opening to language than speaking itself, a longing opening to willing than 
an understanding of what one intends, a looking that searches not for something but 
for how seeing and the seen can possibly find their be-longing, their longing to be. 
These primordial concerns that open to something fundamental in a question of 
freedom, action, willing and becoming, become our concerns as well: we too are faced 
with a question of how our seeing and what we see find their belonging, with what 
opens our language, with what essentially is the temporality of our becoming a self, 
how we exist with evil. [SHOW CLIPS] 
 
 
Philosophy and Cinema 
 
 
In finding an identity of Dumont and Schelling are we wanting to relate the ‘content’ 
of Dumont’s films to the ‘content’ of Schelling’s treatise; are we wanting to relate the 
forms, formalisms or morphology of Dumont’s films to the system-building of German 
Idealism’s philosophy of nature? What would we ‘interpret’ in each work if not one or 
other or both of these? But do we encounter a treatise or a film the way we encounter 
a table or door? In one sense we do. They are all things we run into, encounter. We 
hold a book with the same hand we use to open a door. We sit at a table, adjusting 
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our self, as we would settle into a cinema seat. But we need to read a book and ‘see’ a 
film. Each has a temporality essential to it. Each is ‘in time’ in a way a door or table 
are differently in time. I do not mean duration or ‘clock’ time, when we can snatch a 
moment to indulge in a bit of reading. In what way are films and books essentially in 
time?  
 
Equally, we say both films and books use language. To be sure, a film has a ‘visual’ 
language, and an aural complexity for which the voice is one component. Dumont’s 
films are subtitled. Hence I “read” his dialogue in translation. I also read Schelling in 
translation. As ‘translations’ they share something about language in as much as it is 
translatable. But do films and books essentially ‘use’ language? What is the ‘word’ 
such that it happens in a philosophical treatise and in a contemporary film? We have 
focused on a question of ‘temporality’ and a question of ‘language’. One more consideration: 
both the treatise and the film are ‘creations’ by ‘creatures’. Are creations made using 
languages and temporality? Given time, we all could possibly do most things. But we 
don’t. The finitude of temporality and the finitude of language are not the instruments 
at our disposal in order to create. Rather, creations, in their creating, in their essential 
be-coming to existence, disclose temporality and the word in their finitude. 
Essentially, the relation of the existent, the creature, to its becoming opens something 
essential to an understanding of the temporality of the work and its ‘image’. It 
happens that this singular philosophical treatise by Schelling and this singular body of 
works by Dumont each essentially concerns itself with this existence of a creating 






It was not the case that no one thought of evil prior to Schelling. All philosophy, from 
Plato’s agathon, “highest good,” to Kant’s moral imperative thought of the “good” as 
existing, or with Plato, beyond Being.9 In Christian metaphysics, the highest Being, 
the summun ens, God, whether transcendent or immanent to beings, as the 
unconditioned cause of all beings, and ‘Himself’ perfection, necessitated that ‘evil’ was 
not a being. Rather, ‘evil’ was the possibility of a distance from God, from the good. 
Only the ‘good’ existed. Evil did not exist. It was not actual, living. The sheer 
radicality of Schelling is that he proposed that evil is a being, an existent, along with 
the good. Moreover, and this is radical, he demanded that the existence of evil is 
necessary for human freedom, which means evil is necessary for the giving that is God’s 
love. The difficulty that thwarted earlier philosophers was precisely the question as to 
how God could cause evil. How could eternal perfection be the cause of evil? 
Schelling’s thinking required something extremely original in maintaining God as 
perfection, yet allowing his creation to include evil as an existent.  
 
Human beings in their becoming, which is to say, in their coming to self-hood, to the 
in-itself of itself as identity and, thereby, as freedom, are the becoming will of an 
existent, a will-to-what-is-willed. This coming to itself of a subject is a movement from 
a primordial willing that, as yet, had no name for what it wills. Schelling calls this 
‘longing’. Again, the radicality of Schelling is that longing is the Nature of the Ground 
in God. Heidegger suggests: “eternal longing is striving which itself, however, never 
admits of a stable formation because it always wants to remain longing. As a striving 
	   4	  
without understanding, it has nothing which has been understood and is brought to 
stand and stability, nothing which could call something definite, unified. It is 
‘nameless’; it does not know any name; it is unable to name what it is striving for. It is 
lacking the possibility of words.” I am suggesting that the profound attunement of 
Dumont’s cinema is longing in this sense of a striving that has yet, in its primordiality, 
to come to the word. Longing is an opening to willing that has yet to find the word, a 
silent opening to language as the naming of things. The finality of becoming happens 
in the understanding of the existent as existing, as known to itself, ‘understanding’ that is 
the unity of will and what is willed, a self identity as free.  
 
Where does freedom come into it? Freedom is ‘freedom for’ the existent, an openness 
to what is. For Schelling, the greatest freedom is openness to the universal will, to 
God, the greatest good, to what is most opposed to an in-itself for-itself. In the 
movement from primordial longing, to the bestowal of the word to understanding, 
human beings are open not to the possibility of degrees of the good but to the actuality 
of evil, of closing off universal will for the sake of an exclusive maintenance of an in-
itself for-itself, of being closed off to the being-with of what is different as the in-itself 
of another. Love is the jointure of an in-itself to what is opposed to it as an other. 
Human beings, in their freedom, are free to do good and to do evil. Both are not only 
possible but, necessarily, actual. God’s love is precisely the higher unity of the 
unbridgeable separation of the in-itself of good and the in-itself of evil, that ‘good’ is 
and that ‘evil’ is. Schelling’s ontology is a theology. We encounter an onto-theology 
within a Christian tradition of metaphysics. What is radical, though, is that he 
approaches the question of the human from something other than an essential 
humanism. Human being is disclosed as that being who is most open to the question 
of being, the question of an opening to the word and an opening to temporality. 
Human freedom is not something innate and essential to the human, but rather 
something essential to being in its showing. How does being disclose? 
 
 
Violence and Metaphysics 
 
These human creatures are capable of the most terrible things, the worst of possible 
things, the least explainable, and the most savage and incomprehensible things. 
Schelling admits that human freedom is incomprehensible. Kant does as well. 
Heidegger suggests that no animal is capable of evil. To sink below animal being is 
reserved for human evil. In a comment that might epitomize Dumont’s cinema as 
distinctly different from a cinema that aims at picturing a world, Heidegger suggests: 
“Man is not an object of observation placed before us which we then drape with little 
everyday feelings. Rather, man is experienced in the insight into the abysses and 
heights of Being, in regard to the terrible element of the godhead, the lifedread of all 
creatures, the sadness of all created creatures, the malice of evil and the will of love.”  
Cinema is no stranger to tragic drama, to the depiction of violence, to disgust, to 
moral enigma, to un-resolvable paradox, to strangulating double binds. Cinema shows 
these things, represents them as objectively present for a viewing ‘subject’ such that we 
can remember or forget them, confuse scenes or recount correctly what happened, 
appraise aesthetically or ethically concerning the film, film-maker, audience, industry 
and so on. There is so much culture building to do, and so much cinema, now DVD, 
now direct-internet download, in a public place, at home, on one of my many 
television sets, wide-screen, blue-ray, home-theatre surround-sound and so on. Is 
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‘being’ disclosed in this way, on blue-ray surround sound? What is our guiding 
question for Dumont’s cinema? It too shows more than enough violence. Shall we 
describe some to get a taste for it or to set the scene, to pick out the thematic and 
point to evidence of evil, no doubt ‘acted’ but actual nonetheless? Is this disclosing 
‘being’? What else is ‘cinema’ than a representing-represented of or for an ‘I’ ‘think’ ‘I 
will’? Let us consider the Dumont films in a number of ways. Dumont is a creating 
creature whose finitude means in actuality that his existence is not eternally in harmony 
with his becoming in-itself. He is not God. The temporality of his becoming is the un-
concealing of his essential freedom to be in the letting be of beings that are or in a 
willing standing over and against. This temporality is the unconcealing of his being as 
freedom. He creates from a primordial longing-for, prior to its formation, prior to its 
saying or openness to language, to an understanding of himself in the image of his 
creation, in the identity of what he willed-to-be and his willing. He made films. But he 
made films for … for what: for some ones surely? But more so, for the showing not of this 
character’s love or violence, going here or there, living or dying, having this beginning 
or that ending, but rather for the showing of this very becoming existent creature of a 
self-creating in the actuality of committing good and evil and the absolute necessity of 
both as the necessity of freedom. The fundamental moods and understanding of his 
work are attunements to longing and rage, to silence as an opening to saying, to the 
moment of looking as an opening to touching, to the indifference of a polarized in-
itself of sexed differences to the absolute malice of violent inhumanity, within each of 
the films L’humanité, Twenty Nine Palms and Flanders, encountered as violent rape: of a 
child, of a man, of a woman. There is no cinematic ‘successful’, ‘idealized ‘or ‘normal’ 
sexual relations in Dumont’s films. Sex is life’s primordial longing, will’s coming to 
existence, its birth to presence. Sex is in search of the word, Spirit, love, a higher unity 
of the good. Dumont’s films traverse in their becoming film, becoming existent, the 
becoming existent of sexed being for which language is not an already ‘there’ 
wellspring of joyous sentiment or bon mots. Language, that the existent may come to 
itself in its image, is the most vicious, difficult, abyssal and dangerous emergence. No 
idle talk. No loud speakers: immense failures and small, almost non-consequential 
disclosures; terrible things, the worst of worlds, with a small, very small, humanity that 
shines or shows itself. Yet it is this, the actuality of evil, the becoming indifference of 
an in-itself foregoing the genuine harmony of its coming to be that shows the 
implacability of the essence of freedom. That it is. 
 
 
 
